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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE AFTERMATH 





KATHY L. CERMINARA* 
INTRODUCfION 
Theresa Marie Schiavo died a celebrity at the age of forty-two 
in Pinellas Park, Florida, in early 2005.1 She never sought the pub­
lic spotlight; she never even knew she was a celebrity. She became 
a celebrity, and one of the best-known figures in bioethics, because 
of politics. 
In testament to the power of the politics surrounding Ms. Schi­
avo's death, numerous authors have written an incredible amount 
about her case. Many articles have focused on the constitutional 
implications of the controversy.2 Others have discussed the inter­
section of Ms. Schiavo's case and the interests of people with disa­
bilities,3 or have analyzed the Schiavo case within the framework of 
* Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. Thanks 
go to Barbara Noah for the opportunity to write this, to Mary Coombs for assistance in 
making this better, and to Jennifer Rolnick for research assistance. 
1. Kathy L. Cerminara, Theresa Marie Schiavo's Long Road to Peace, 30 DEATH 
STUD. 101, 111 (2006). For a complete interactive timeline linking to key documents in 
the case, see Kathy L. Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo, University of Miami-Ethics Program, http://www6.miami.edu/ 
ethics/schiavo/terrLschiavo_timeline.html [hereinafter Cerminara & Goodman, Time­
line j (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (listing her death at the Mar. 31, 2005 entry). 
2. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, 35 STETSON L. REV. 
179 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy j; Michael P. Allen, Congress 
and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. 
REV. 309 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo j; Terri D. Keville & Jon 
B. Eisenberg, Bush v. Schiavo and the Separation of Powers: Why a State Legislature 
Cannot Empower a Governor to Order Medical Treatment When There is a Final Court 
Judgment that the Patient Would Not Want It, 7 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 81 (2005); 
Thomas C. Marks, Jr., A Dissenting Opinion, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 
2004),35 STETSON L. REV. 195 (2005); Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: 
Lessons From the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (2004). 
3. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End­
of-Life Reform Uphold a Disabled Person's Interest in Continued Life?, in IMPROVING 
END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN So DIFFICULT?, Hastings Ctr. Special Report 
35, No.6 S31 (2005); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, 22 CONST. COM­
MENT. 457 (2005) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case j; Kathy L. 
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end-of-life decision-making law.4 Most of the attorneys and other 
living participants in the drama have written books about their ex­
periences in connection with the case.s While none of these authors 
have ignored, or could have ignored, the politics surrounding what 
happened to Ms. Schiavo, only a few have concentrated on it.6 This 
Article, building on what those authors have written, examines the 
politics surrounding her death and draws some conclusions about 
the aftermath for those left behind in the America Ms. Schiavo 
departed. 
I. THE POLITICS OF SCHIA vo 
Because of the extensive amount already written about it, this 
Article will not recount in exhaustive detail the basic facts of Schi­
avo. Instead, it will briefly introduce the reader to Ms. Schiavo and 
then enumerate the myriad ways in which politics played a role in 
her death. 
Cerminara, Musings on the Need to Convince Some People with Disabilities that End-of­
Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 343 
(2006) [hereinafter Cerminara, Musings]; Lois L. Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disa­
bility Rights Community (Fla. State Univ. ColI. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 188, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882480; see also Sa­
muel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425, 
427 (2006) (using Schiavo as a springboard to discuss the positions of disability rights 
activists in the areas of "nontreatment of infants with disabilities, proposals to legalize 
assisted suicide, and the practice of prenatal testing followed by selective abortion"). 
4. William Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life: Dejii Vu All Over Again in 
the Schiavo Saga, 35 STETSON L. REV. 123 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Erring Too Far on 
the Side of Life]; Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of 
the Forces Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. 147 (2005) [hereinafter 
Cerminara, Tracking the Storm]; John A. Robertson, Schiavo and its (In)significance 35 
STETSON L. REv. 101 (2005); Lois L. Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in 
End-of-Life Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CUMBo L. REv. 575 
(2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth]. 
5. JON B. EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S CONSPIRACY TO 
TAKE AWAY OUR RIGHTS (2005) [hereinafter EISENBERG, USING TERRI]; JON B. EI­
SENBERG, THE RIGHT VS. THE RIGHT TO DIE: LESSONS FROM THE TERRI SCHIAVO 
CASE AND How TO STOP IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2006); DAVID C. GIBBS WITH 
BOB DEMoss, FIGHTING FOR DEAR LIFE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF TERRI SHIAVO AND 
WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US (2006); MICHAEL SCHIAVO WITH MICHAEL HIRSH, 
TERRI: THE TRUTH (2006); MARY SCHINDLER ET AL., A LIFE THAT MATTERS: THE 
LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAvo-A LESSON FOR ALL OF US (2006). 
6. See, e.g., George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed By Ideology in 
the Political Debate Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49 (2005); Cerminara, 
Tracking the Storm, supra note 4; Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Biopolitics: Judicial Process, 
Religious Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553 (2006). Keville 
and Eisenberg identify one issue raised by Schiavo as being "whether politics and popu­
lar opinion should play any role in individual medical treatment decisions." Keville & 
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 83 (emphasis added). 
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The basic facts of Schiavo were simple. In 1990, at the age of 
thirty-six, Theresa Marie Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest. Initially, 
her husband and parents were united in seeking aggressive treat­
ment, including experimental therapy, in an attempt to revive her 
from what physicians said was a persistent vegetative state (PVS).7 
After three to four years of such efforts, however, Ms. Schiavo's 
husband began to accept physicians' statements that she would 
never regain cognitive function. 8 Ms. Schiavo's parents and siblings 
did not.9 Thus, they objected when Mr. Schiavo, acting as Ms. Schi­
avo's guardian, approached the Florida guardianship court to ask 
the court to determine whether Ms. Schiavo would want to be 
maintained on medically supplied nutrition and hydration in the 
condition in which she existed. 
A. The Litigation 
When Mr. Schiavo filed suit in 1998, the case was a typical end­
of-life decision-making case of no great import, presenting well-set­
tled issues under Florida law. Florida law clearly permitted with­
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment when a patient was 
in a PVS.I0 Florida lawmakers also clearly considered medically 
supplied nutrition and hydration to be a form of life-sustaining 
treatment.ll Thus, if the court determined by clear and convincing 
evidence that Ms. Schiavo would not have wanted medically sup­
plied nutrition and hydration to continue when she lay in a PVS, 
the law was clear that treatment should be withdrawn. After a five­
7. The law uses the term "persistent vegetative state," although neurologists dif­
ferentiate between a "persistent" and a "permanent" vegetative state. Roughly speak­
ing, a patient is said to be in a persistent vegetative state when in a "cognitively 
unresponsive state" for more than a month, and to be in a permanent vegetative state if 
the condition lasts for twelve months. Nancy L. Childs & Walt N. Mercer, Brief Report: 
Late Improvement in Consciousness After Post-Traumatic Vegetative State, 334 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 24, 24-25 (1996). 
8. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 87-89, 99. 
9. See generally SCHINDLER ET AL., supra note 5. 
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.302(1) (West 2005) (specifying that a patient may, 
in advance, direct the withholding or withdrawal of "life-prolonging procedures" at a 
time in which he or she is, inter alia, in a persistent vegetative state). 
11. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(10) (West 2005) (defining "life-prolonging 
procedure" to include "artificially provided sustenance and hydration"); see also In re 
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11-12 (Fla. 1990) (finding a constitutional right 
to refuse medically supplied nutrition and hydration); David Casarett et aI., Appropri­
ate Use of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration-Fundamental Principles and Recommen­
dations, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2607, 2607 (2005) (describing agreement that medically 
supplied nutrition and hydration as being treatment as "well established among 
ethicists, clinicians and the courts"). 
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day evidentiary hearing, during which it considered, and either 
credited or discounted, the testimony of eighteen witnesses, the 
court did so determine and authorized Mr. Schiavo to withdraw 
treatment.12 
Thereafter began a lesson in the use of end-of-life litigation as 
an exercise of political power. Numerous amici curiae joined in the 
case, primarily vitalist and disability-rights activists protesting the 
court's ruling and Mr. Schiavo's position in the litigation.13 Multi­
ple motions and appeals caused the case to travel throughout the 
judicial system several times between 2001 and 2003. It is not too 
much to say, as George Annas has, that the attorneys filing the mul­
tiple appeals were not "doing law" but rather "doing politics."14 
Nevertheless, the courts continued to affirm the trial court's deci­
sion. Ms. Schiavo's medically supplied nutrition and hydration 
would be discontinued. 
B. The Legislation 
After politics through litigation failed, it was time for those op­
posing the withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's life-sustaining treatment to 
turn to politics of the old-fashioned kind. Citizens across the coun­
try began to flood both the Florida Legislature and the U.S. Con­
gress with e-mails and telephone calls, although many of them knew 
nothing about the case other than what they had heard on the radio 
or television, or had read on Internet blogs or in e-mails. In late 
2003, the Florida Legislature authorized Governor John Ellis "Jeb" 
Bush to order reinsertion of the tube through which Ms. Schiavo 
received medically supplied nutrition and hydration.15 After that 
law was declared unconstitutional,16 federal legislators acted to au­
thorize review of the case in federal court.17 They also attempted 
12. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908 GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000). 
13. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 4, at 154-55. 
14. George J. Annas, Address at the Health Law Teachers' Conference: The Cul­
ture of Life and the Politics of American Bioethics (June 2, 2006) (on file with Western 
New England Law Review); see also University of Maryland Hosts 30th Annual Health 
Law Teachers Conference, 14 LAW & HEALTH CARE NEWSLETTER 1, 3 (2006), available 
at http://www.law. umaryland.edu/specialty/maryhealth/documents/program_newsletter­
fal12006.pdf (providing a summary of the presentation given by Professor George 
Annas). 
15. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 3, 418, Pub. L. No. 03-418 (2003), declared unconstitutional 
by Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). 
16. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321. 
17. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 
109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
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otherwise to prevent adherence to the state court determination,1S 
despite the tremendous amount of review the case had already re­
ceived in the Florida state court system. At the same time, efforts 
were under way, not only in the Florida Legislature but also in 
many state legislatures across the land, to substantially revise end­
of-life decision-making law in general, because of the Schiavo 
case.19 
Terri's Law, the 2003 Florida legislation authorizing the gover­
nor to negate the outcome of the state court litigation, transpar­
ently put political interests above concern for appropriate 
government· functioning. Michael Allen has called Terri's Law 
"both an unabashed legislative intrusion on the judicial branch and 
a simultaneous transfer of legislative authority to the executive 
branch."20 He has written eloquently about its "gross deficiencies 
under even the most basic separation of powers analysis," and has 
opined that "[q]uite frankly, it is difficult to find any action taken 
by a legislature or executive in the United States that can be classi­
fied as such a fundamental breach of the constitutional separation 
of powers."21 By authorizing Governor Bush to order resumption 
of treatment, the law, written to apply only to the Schiavo case, 
essentially empowered the governor to reverse a judicial decision 
by acting as a super-surrogate for Ms. Schiavo.22 Yet the law did 
not require the governor to investigate, or even to consider, what 
Ms. Schiavo's wishes would have been with respect to the treatment 
choice in question, as surrogate decision-makers generally must.23 
18. Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life, supra note 4, at 135 (describing 
attempts to subpoena Ms. Schiavo to appear before the United States House Commit­
tee on Oversight and Government Reform as "motivated not by a search for accurate 
information, but rather as a ruse for additional delay in the court-ordered removal of 
Ms. Schiavo's nutrition and hydration tube"); see also Thomas W. Mayo, Living and 
Dying In a Post Schiavo World, 38 J. HEALTH L. 587, 591-92 (2005). 
19. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3, at 381 n.243 (listing bills); see also Lois 
Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo: What Are They Thinking?, 15 
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 361 (2006) [hereinafter Shepherd, State Legislative 
Proposals Following Schiavo]. 
20. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, supra note 2, at 187. 
21. Id.; see also id. at 192 (describing Bush v. Schiavo, the Florida Supreme Court 
decision that invalidated Terri's Law as "a protection of liberty and a rejection of tyr­
anny"); Noah, supra note 2, at 116-20. 
22. Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 93-95. 
23. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF 
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 3-47 to 3-49 (3d ed., Aspen 2006). It was in fact the 
lack of decision-making standards that led the Florida Supreme Court to note a delega­
tion problem, not just a separation of powers problem, with the law. See Bush v. Schi­
avo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332-36 (Fla. 2004). 
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Clearly, Terri's Law had "nothing to do with substituted judgment 
decision-making and everything to do with politics. "24 
Even before Terri's Law was invalidated, and continuing with 
renewed frenzy thereafter, the Florida Legislature considered ma­
jor changes to Florida's end-of-life decision-making law in reaction 
to Schiavo. The Legislature considered multiple bills based on a 
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) model statute. Those 
bills would have limited the rights of Floridians to make end-of-life 
treatment choices about medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 
Additionally, the proponents of those bills intended them to re­
quire restoration of treatment in Ms. Schiavo's case.2S The Legisla­
ture debated those proposals longer than the incredibly brief three 
days it took to pass Terri's Law,26 but nonetheless engaged in that 
debate in the heat of the moment, while receiving thousands of 
frantic e-mails and telephone calls pleading for someone to save 
Ms. Schiavo's life. After Ms. Schiavo had died, and when the im­
mediate political crisis had passed, legislators reflected on what 
they nearly had done and realized how much the frenzy had af­
fected their judgment. At that time, it became clear that such a bill 
would not pass.27 
Previously, legislators in Florida had done a superb job of de­
veloping the state's end-of-life decision-making law in a thoughtful, 
deliberate manner. Legislators had considered all viewpoints the 
last time they significantly revised the law. At that time, they not 
24. Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 95. 
25. Kathy L. Cerminara, Legislative End-Run Around Supreme Court in Schiavo 
Case Threatens Separation of Powers, DAILY Bus. REv., Mar. 18,2005, at 13; see also 
Annas, supra note 6, at 57 (describing attempts in Florida to pass "new legislation 
aimed at restoring the feeding tube"); Jay Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attor­
neys When Good Law is All You Have: Reflections of the Special Guardian ad Litem to 
Theresa Marie Schiavo, 38 J. HEALTH L. 535, 537-38 (2005) [hereinafter Wolfson, Schi­
avo's Lessons for Health Attorneys]. 
26. Noah, supra note 2, at 114 n.26. 
27. See Maya Bell, Debate About How to Die Rages On, But Chasm Grows, OR· 
LANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2006, at AI, available at 2006 WLNR 5017182 (Westlaw) 
[hereinafter Bell, Debate About How to Die Rages On]; Maya Bell, Governor Aban­
dons Feeding-Tube Efforts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13,2006, at B7, available at 2006 
WLNR 6227279 (Westlaw). The Florida Senate's Committee on Health Care studied 
and reported on Florida's existing statutory scheme in late 2005, after Ms. Schiavo's 
death. Interim Project Report 2006-137, Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care (2005), avail­
able at http://www.f!senate.gov/datalPublications/2006/Senate/reports/interim_reportsl 
pdfl2006-137he.pdf. The Committee concluded that, "Florida's laws governing the sub­
stantiation and safeguarding of written and oral advance directives work for the major­
ity of Floridians." [d. at 9. The Committee did not recommend any "statutory 
changes." Id. 
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only listened to experts and persons who contacted them about pro­
posed revisions, but they also held public hearings across the state 
to learn from the experiences of those who might not be able to 
contact lawmakers themselves.28 In contrast, the attempts to revise 
Florida's end-of-life decision-making law in response to Schiavo re­
sulted solely from short-sighted, special-interest-motivated attempts 
to respond to vocal constituents with political weight. 
During this same time period, and continuing after Ms. Schiavo 
had died, myriad state legislatures similarly responded to the Schi­
avo controversy by considering the same sorts of changes to their 
state end-of-life decision-making laws.29 Most of their proposed 
changes also were based on the NRLC Model Act and, thus, prima­
rily addressed the withholding or withdrawal of medically supplied 
nutrition and hydration as opposed to other life-sustaining treat­
ment.30 Specifically, the Model Act would have established a pre­
sumption that an incapacitated patient wanted medically supplied 
nutrition and hydration regardless of that patient's medical condi­
tion, unless the nutrition and hydration was medically contraindi­
cated or the patient had previously explicitly stated, preferably in 
writing, that he or she did not desire nutrition and hydration.31 
28. See Robert G. Brooks et aI., Advancing End-of-Life Care: Lessons Learned 
From a Statewide Panel, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 821 (2003) (describing the operation of 
the Florida Panel for the Study of End-of-Life Care and the results of its recommenda­
tions); see also Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life, supra note 4, at 134-35 
(describing the same panel); Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra 
note 25, at 547 (describing Florida law on these issues as having been "carefully 
crafted" through that process). 
29. Mayo, supra note 18, at 597-98; see also Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals 
Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 11-14. 
30. See Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 297, 329 (2006) (stating that legislation in many states was based on the NRLC 
Model Act); NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., MODEL STARVATION AND DEHYDRATION 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES PREVENTION Aer (2006) [hereinafter NRLC MODEL 
Aer], available at http://www.nrlc.org!euthanasia/modeln&hstatelaw.pdf (bearing nota­
tion "Revised January 2006"). 
31. See Nat'! Right to Life Comm., Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo Case, Model 
State Law to Prevent Starvation & Dehydration Proposed [hereinafter Spurred by 
Schindler-Schiavo Case], http://www.nrlc.org!euthanasialModelBillAnnoucement.html 
(last visited Jan. 16,2007). Compare NRLC MODEL Aer, supra note 30, with H.B. 701, 
2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (version introduced in Florida during the Schiavo de­
bates). The existence of such a presumption in favor of the administration of medically 
supplied nutrition and hydration echoes a presumption appearing in the Roman Catho­
lic Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals (ERD) promulgated by the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Leonard J. Nelson, III, Catholic Bioethics 
and the Case of Terri Schiavo, 35 CUMBo L. REV. 543, 556-57 (2005) (citing Directive 58 
of the 1994 ERD, reiterated in the 2001 ERD). The similarity between the NRLC 
Model Act and the ERD raises at least two concerns. First, one wonders at the propri­
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Public opinion polls and surveys indicated that most constituents 
did not in fact want end-of-life decision-making choices to be lim­
ited in this manner,32 but politicians introduced the bills because 
they listened to vocal e-mailers and callers, as well as to the power­
ful special interest groups behind those e-mailers and callers. While 
this simply may be one of the consequences of having a representa­
tive rather than a parliamentary government,33 the phenomenon 
certainly illustrates the power of political forces in Schiavo. 
Finally, it is impossible to forget the most nationally visible po­
litical activity relating to Ms. Schiavo. In early March 2005, slightly 
more than three weeks before Ms. Schiavo's death, federallegisla­
tors began introducing bills about the case in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.34 Later in March, in an "event unique in Ameri­
can politics,"35 the U.S. Congress reconvened from Easter recess to 
pass emergency legislation that would give Ms. Schiavo's parents 
the right to file suit in federal court to have the case reviewed 
again.36 Just as in the Florida Legislature, debate was "frenzied"37 
ety of an attempt to virtually pluck a concept from a Roman Catholic document and 
insert it into state law in multicultural America. Second, even if such incorporation of a 
particular religion's directives into law is appropriate, the ERD, as Nelson notes, is not 
as clear with respect to withholding or withdrawal of medically supplied nutrition as 
focus on this single provision would indicate. See id. 
32. See Robert J. Blendon et aI., The American Public and the Terri Schiavo Case, 
165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2580,2584 (2005) (concluding, based on meta-analysis 
of the results of twelve opinion surveys, that "[e]fforts to place more restrictions on 
choices in cases similar to Terri Schiavo's are likely to prompt vocal opposition from 
those who favor maintaining the choices currently available or expanding them"). 
Medical professionals would not like to see such laws either. See AM. MED. ASSOC'N, 
AMA-YPS DELEGATE'S REPORT 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.orglamallpub/upload/mml17/a2005delegatesreport. pdf (see "Res­
olution 209," resolving that the AMA opposes such legislation); Gina Shaw, Schiavo's 
Legislative Legacy: New Look at Consent, Living Wills, and Advance Directives, NEU­
ROLOGY TODAY, June 2005, at 1 (describing neurologists' concerns about such 
legislation). 
33. Cf R. Alta Charo, Realbioethik, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2005, at 13 
[hereinafter Charo, Realbioethik] (identifying "fear [of] the ten-second spot" as one of 
the reasons that a politician would not vote against the federal legislation regarding 
Schiavo). 
34. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Mar. 8, 2005 entry. 
35. Annas, supra note 6, at 58. 
36. See Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 318-20 (describing the 
legislation, which granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims arising "under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States related to the withholding or withdrawal of 
food, fluids, or medical treatment"). 
37. Annas describes the debate in the U.S. House of Representatives as being 
"notable primarily for its incredibly uninformed and frenzied rhetoric" and notes that 
C-SPAN covered it live. Annas, supra note 6, at 61; see also Bagenstos, Judging the 
Schiavo Case, supra note 3, at 458 (describing the "[l]ack of meaningful congressional 
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and was prompted by myriad calls and e-mails to members of Con­
gress from constituents who were themselves motivated by emotion 
whipped up for political purposes.38 The law itself, limited to au­
thorization of a suit by Ms. Schiavo's parents,39 did not go so far as 
Congress might have tried to go,40 but it nevertheless was notable in 
terms of both policy-making and its manner of passage.41 Michael 
deliberation" in a "highly charged atmosphere" and "the attempts by many politicians 
to use the courts (as weapons or targets) in a political battle"). 
38. See Ronald Cranford, Facts, Lies and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative 
State and the Sad Case of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 363, 369 (2005) 
(describing a "strategy of misinformation" involving the use of videotapes originally 
created to assist the courts in understanding Ms. Schiavo's condition "to mislead much 
of the media and public into believing that Terri could meaningfully and cognitively 
interact with her parents and thus was not in a vegetative state"). 
39. In that sense, the law seemed like a private law. The U.S. Senate website 
discusses a private bill in the following manner: 
A private bill provides benefits to specified individuals (including corpo­
rate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private legislation 
when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted. Many private bills deal 
with immigration-granting citizenship or permanent residency. Private bills 
may also be introduced for individuals who have claims against the govern­
ment, veterans [sic] benefits claims, claims for military decorations, or taxation 
problems. The title of a private bill usually begins with the phrase, "For the 
relief of ...." If a private bill is passed in identical form by both houses of 
Congress and is signed by the President, it becomes a private law. 
U.S. Senate, Legislation, Laws, and Acts, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/ 
briefinglle~laws_acts.htm (last visited Jan. 16,2007). The federal law was indeed titled, 
"An Act For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo." An Act for the Relief 
of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, S.686, 109th Congo (2005), available at http:// 
www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/032005-USSenate_ Compromise _in_Schiavo. 
pdf. Yet, as is apparent from its citation, the Act has been accorded a Public Law 
number. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
40. As Michael Allen notes, the proposed Protection of Incapacitated Persons 
Act, H.R. 1332, 109th Congo (2005), would have gone further in authorizing federal 
court review of whether the Constitution or federal laws had been violated in any case 
in which the State court authorize[d] or direct[ed] the withholding or with­
drawal of food or fluids or medical treatment necessary to sustain the incapaci­
tated person's life, but ... not ... a claim or cause of action in which no party 
disputes, and the court finds, that the incapacitated person, while having ca­
pacity, had executed a written advance directive valid under applicable law 
that clearly authorized the withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or med­
ical treatment in the applicable circumstances. 
Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 318 n.36; Protection of Incapaci­
tated Persons Act, H.R. 1332, 109th Congo § 2 (2005), available at http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=109_con~bills&docid=f:hI332eh.txt.pdf. 
41. Allen identifies two levels of objections to it based on policy, as opposed to 
constitutional objections. First, "[t]he ultimate result was federal interference in a ba­
sic, personal decision, something that seems quite difficult to justify." Allen, Congress 
and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 315 & n.29. Second, the way in which Congress 
passed it and the President signed it was "not the way in which many citizens would 
hope or expect their government to form policy." Jd. 
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Allen has aptly described this federal law as "appear[ing] to be fo­
cused largely on a combination of political opportunism and politi­
cal cowardice instead of rational policy determinations."42 
These are only the major political activities, not even the most 
bizarre ones, that surrounded Ms. Schiavo's death. The U.S. House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform incredibly at­
tempted to use its subpoena power, as Ms. Schiavo lay dying, to 
require that she be maintained in order to appear before it, with 
equipment intact, for a hearing and an inspection of her medical 
equipment.43 It is impossible to forget the day Floridians realized 
that Ms. Schiavo's case was being considered simultaneously within 
the federal courts, the state courts, the federal legislature, the state 
legislature, and Florida's Department of Children and Families.44 
That was also the day on which Governor Bush intended to order 
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to storm Ms. Schi­
avo's hospice to remove her and resume her treatment.45 Even af­
ter Ms. Schiavo's death, Governor Bush ordered a prosecutor to 
investigate whether Michael Schiavo had delayed calling 911 on the 
night of Ms. Schiavo's cardiac arrest fifteen years previously.46 
In sum, it is safe to say that politics abounded in Schiavo and 
its aftermath nearly from start to finish, from the courtroom to the 
legislature, to the governor's mansion, to the Oval Office. The task 
remains to learn from the political firestorm. 
II. THE AFTERMATH 
Schiavo unquestionably will impact end-of-life decision-mak­
ing in America for years to come. Both individuals and individual 
42. See id. at 314. 
43. Exhibit 2, Emergency All-Writs Petition In the Matter of Schiavo v. Robert 
Schindler & Mary Schindler, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) (No. 90-2908-GD-003), 
available at http://www6.miami.eduJethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/031805-USHousePetit ion_ 
Sct.pdf. 
44. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Mar. 23,2005 entry; 
see also In re Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (describing state court 
activity with respect to the Department of Children and Families' position). 
45. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 239, 307 (stating that these events all 
happened on the same day); see also Dara Kam, Agents Readied in Case "Legal Win­
dow" Opened, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 8 (describing plans to "seize" Ms. 
Schiavo if an opportunity arose). Governor Bush also had ordered the Florida Depart­
ment of Law Enforcement to rush into the hospice to take Ms. Schiavo to a hospital 
immediately upon the passage of Terri's Law in 2003. See SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra 
note 5, at 239. 
46. Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at June 17 & June 27, 2005 
entries. 
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cases will be affected, while the general tone and pattern of end-of­
life decision-making law likely will change. Even beyond the realm 
of end-of-life decision-making law, the politics of Schiavo, for bet­
ter or worse, serves as an example of a more general politicization 
of bioethics. Finally, Schiavo teaches some major lessons about the 
functioning of our American constitutional republican form of 
government. 
A. Lessons for Individuals and Relating to Individual Cases 
The political furor surrounding Schiavo will impact the individ­
ual patient care setting in at least two ways. First, as has been 
widely discussed, people reacted to Schiavo by flocking to hospitals, 
clinics, physicians' offices, and other health care provider locations, 
not to mention attorneys' offices, to obtain and execute advance 
directive forms.47 While that development would seem to indicate 
that health care providers in the future will see more patients who 
have advance directives, such a conclusion does not necessarily fol­
low. This reaction to a highly publicized end-of-life decision-mak­
ing case is not a new phenomenon and is not likely to have a long­
lasting effect. A similar rush to execute advance directive forms 
happened after the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Cruzan v. 
Director,48 but the percentage of persons with advance directives 
still was not very high at the time of Schiavo, fifteen years later.49 
In fact, one wonders if Americans simply must, every fifteen years 
or so, endure debate over the propriety of withdrawing life-sus­
47. Shaw, supra note 32, at 2-3 (quoting the Death with Dignity spokesperson, 
who stated: "All the web sites that help prepare advance directives have had a huge 
increase in traffic"); Diane C. Lade, Free Seminars Focus on End-oj-Life Papers, S. FLA. 
SUN-SENTINEL, May 10, 2005, at 4B, available at 2005 WLNR 23632439 (Westlaw) 
(quoting Secretary of Florida Department of Elder Affairs as saying that the effort to 
provide more information about advance directives "was in response to the Terri Schi­
avo case"); Diane C. Lade, Schiavo Debate Hits Home for the Young: More People Are 
Thinking About Living Will Forms, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 1,2005, at lA, avail­
able at 2005 WLNR 23670975 (WestIaw) ("How do you get young people to make out a 
living will when they have no concept of their own mortality? Two words: Terri Schi­
avo."); Schiavo Case Revives Interest in Wills, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 24, 2005, at 14, avail­
able at 2005 WLNR 13854639 ("As the struggle between [Terri Schiavo's] parents and 
husband over the removal of a feeding tube continues, Americans are signing living 
wills as never before."). 
48. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
49. PEW RESEARCH CrR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, STRONG PUBLIC SuP· 
PORT FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE: MORE AMERICANS DISCUSSING-AND PLANNING­
END-OF-LIFE TREATMENT 2 (2006) [hereinafter PEW REPORT], available at http:// 
people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=266 (showing that in 1990, 12 percent 
of those surveyed had living wills; in 2005, the number had risen to 29 percent). 
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taining treatment from a young woman50 to raise their conscious­
ness about advance directives and to re-energize them into 
discussing end-of-life treatment choices with each other. 
The political furor sparked by Schiavo will also likely affect 
individual surrogate decision-makers in the future. Michael Schi­
avo endured a great deal of criticism, including death threats aimed 
at both him and his family.51 State officials investigated his actions 
and his motives several times.52 During the heat of the battle, and 
even after the autopsy on Ms. Schiavo's body, several commenta­
tors opined that his recollection of her wishes must have been false 
because he waited so long to voice and act upon those wishes.53 
Even if he truly believed that he was representing Ms. Schiavo's 
wishes (and the court found that he was), he easily could have been 
frightened into abandoning the pursuit of those wishes.54 While 
some would have praised such an outcome, and in fact may have 
intended their actions to result in such abandonment, a precise and 
critical examination of the criticism Michael Schiavo endured leads 
50. The seminal case in end-of-life decision-making law is In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976), which involved a young woman. In 1990, fifteen years after Quinlan, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cruzan, again involving a young woman. Then Schi­
avo involved a young woman in the early twenty-first century. Ms. Schiavo died fifteen 
years after Cruzan was decided and thirty years to the day after Quinlan was decided. 
See generally WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN 
AMERICA (2006); Annette E. Clark, The Right to Die: The Broken Road From Quinlan 
to Schiavo, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 385 (2006). 
51. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 287 (describing letters "that talked 
about how kids disappear from their homes every day"); id. at 290 (quoting threat on 
blog: "'If we kill Michael Schiavo, the parents will be her closest relatives. FL gun 
owners, it's in your hands' "); see also Man Arrested in Alleged Schiavo Case Murder 
Plot, CNN.cOM, Mar. 26, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005IUS/03/25/arrest.schiavo. 
52. The Department of Children and Families received, investigated, and ruled 
unfounded, eighty-nine complaints of abuse in the four years after the trial court's deci­
sion. Maya Bell, Schiavo Records Show No Abuse, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 17, 
2005, at 6B. Even after Ms. Schiavo's death in 2005, Governor Bush ordered a state 
investigation into whether criminal charges should be filed against Mr. Schiavo based 
on questions about how quickly he had called 911 in 1990, some fifteen years earlier. 
Abby Goodnough, Governor Bush Seeks Another Inquiry in Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2005, at AI, available at 2005 WLNR 9670154 (Westlaw). After investigation, 
the prosecutor recommended that no charges be filed. David Royse, Inquiry Finds No 
Sign of Crime in Schiavo's Death, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 8, 2005, at 6B. 
53. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 176. 
54. At one point in early 2005, he was ready to abandon the case, but, at the 
urging of his attorney, he decided he could not do so because "it wasn't just about Terri 
anymore. It was about all the rest of the people who didn't want the government telling 
us how we could die . . .. And whether we were going to let a vocal minority change 
the rules for everybody." Id. at 288. 
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to a surprising conclusion-one that the activists who protested his 
position certainly would not support. 
Michael Schiavo endured criticism on both a substantive and a 
procedural level. Procedurally, the objection was that he must have 
been misrepresenting Ms. Schiavo's wishes to refuse treatment be­
cause he waited too long to voice those wishes. Focusing on that 
criticism could cause a surrogate who is sure that his or her loved 
one wishes to reject treatment to rush to carry out those wishes. 
Michael Schiavo's delay, his willingness to try measures that could 
obviate the need for life-sustaining treatment, resulted in suspicion 
and accusations, so the lesson others take away may be to do the 
opposite: authorize withholding or withdrawing treatment as soon 
as possible. In other words, sadly, the political furor engendered in 
Schiavo could encourage exactly the opposite sort of surrogate de­
cision-making from that which society wants. Rather than giving 
treatment a chance to work, and authorizing withdrawal only after 
it becomes clear that the patient thereafter will exist in a condition 
in which he or she did not want to exist, surrogate decision-makers 
may react to the criticism leveled at Michael Schiavo by acting 
quickly to assert their loved one's wishes. This is not wise as a pol­
icy or a medical matter. 
On the other hand, some of the criticism of Michael Schiavo 
was a reaction to the substance of Ms. Schiavo's wishes, rather than 
the timing of his assertion of those wishes. On that level, future 
surrogate decision-makers, with Schiavo in mind, could hesitate to 
carry out patients' desires to refuse nutrition and hydration because 
they fear inviting such criticism themselves. Such a fear is likely 
unfounded, given that most end-of-life decision-making takes place 
privately rather than in a public setting. Nevertheless, after the 
spectacle this country endured in early 2005, both surrogate deci­
sion-makers and health care providers hereafter may unduly hesi­
tate to honor patients' wishes to withhold or withdraw life­
sustaining treatment. With good cause or not, they may fear spark­
ing pUblicity and a major political debate. 
Clinical bioethics expert Kenneth Goodman calls this phenom­
enon "being Schiavo'ed," which he defines as "the fear of a case 
becoming public and drawing a well-funded campaign to require 
treatment."55 Although unlikely to materialize, the fear has foun­
dation. For example, less than a month after Ms. Schiavo died, the 
55. Bell, Debate About How We Die Rages On, supra note 27 (quoting Kenneth 
Goodman, director of Florida's bioethics network). 
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attorney who represented her parents asked a Georgia court "to 
protect innocent life in the case of Mae Magouirk. "56 The 
Magouirk case, like the Schiavo case, involved a family dispute 
over whether a patient (in Magouirk, an 81-year-old widow) should 
receive medically supplied nutrition and hydration.57 Portrayed as 
being inspired by the Schiavo case, the Magouirk case actually be­
gan even before this attorney became involved in it.58 Like the 
Schiavo case, the Magouirk case spawned blog entries and e-mails 
from pro-life activists to the presiding judge.59 It even prompted 
the hospice in which Ms. Magouirk was a patient to issue a press 
release clarifying that it did not deny patients food and water.60 For 
unknown reasons, it never sparked nationwide furor as Schiavo did, 
but it still serves as a stark illustration that the Schiavo-type, bitter, 
highly publicized dispute is not unique.61 Caregivers might not wish 
to risk becoming involved in such a dispute, so they may continue 
treatment beyond the time at which they and the patient would 
have wanted to cease care. 
Such threats of publicity or well-funded lawsuits62 arise only 
rarely, but are certain to be present when "repeat players," such as 
vitalist and disability activists, enter the realm of end-of-life deci­
sion-making law. "Repeat players" are those who are familiar with 
the court system and who previously have engaged in litigation and 
56. Press Release, Christian Commc'n Network, Terri Schiavo Attorney Calls on 
Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman (Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter "Terri Schiavo At­
torney Calls on Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman"] (on file with the author). 
57. Id. 
58. Compare Denis O'Hayer, Georgia Case Mirrors Schiavo Battle, llALIVE 
NEWS, Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.llalive.comlnews/news_article.aspx?storyid=61478 
(describing the circumstances of the dispute as of April 8, 2005), with Terri Schiavo 
Attorney Calls on Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman, supra note 56 (dating the 
involvement of the Schindlers' attorney to April 14, 2005). 
59. See O'Hayer, supra note 58 (quoting the judge handling the case, Probate 
Judge Donald Boyd, as saying that he had "been accused several times of murder" and 
had received "close to a hundred e-mails"); James Joyner, Terri Schiavo Activists Move 
On to Mae Magouirk (Apr. 9, 2005), http://www.outsidethebeltway.comlcategory/us_ 
politics/terrLschiavo3ase (follow the "Terri Schiavo Activists Move On to Mae 
Magouirk" hyperlink) (blog entry discussing the Mae Magouirk case). 
60. See O'Hayer, supra note 58. 
61. Cruzan also sparked protests. See WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE, 
THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 360-78 (2002). 
62. Jon Eisenberg has traced the funding for Ms. Schiavo's parents' side of the 
litigation to major, wealthy foundations and has detailed the amounts that attorneys on 
both sides of the controversy were paid. EISENBERG, USING TERRI, supra note 5, at 94­
109. 
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anticipate doing so in the future. 63 Repeat players have a number 
of advantages over "one shotters" in any individual case.64 For 
example, 
Repeat players have low stakes in the outcome of any particular 
case and have the resources to pursue their long term interests. 
They can anticipate legal problems and can often structure trans­
actions and compile a record to justify their actions. They de­
velop expertise and have access to specialists who are skilled in 
dealing with particular types of cases or issues. They enjoy econ­
omies of scale and encounter low start-up costs for any particular 
case.65 
When individual cases like Schiavo are swept up in political storms 
because of the involvement of repeat players,66 the power of those 
players can be astonishing. 
Use of litigation to achieve political ends is a time-honored tra­
dition in some areas of the law,67 and this Article does not argue 
that it is inappropriate in all cases. More than 30 years ago, Abram 
Chayes recognized that much of the litigation in this country no 
longer represented the traditional bipolar model of a lawsuit with 
compensation for an injured plaintiff as its primary goal and a 
party-initiated and party-controlled process.68 Chayes identified a 
form of lawsuit he labeled "public law litigation," in which "lawsuits 
do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private 
rights" but "the object of litigation is the vindication of constitu­
tional or statutory policies. "69 School desegregation cases, prison­
ers' rights cases, and certain corporate and environmental law 
cases, to name a sampling, illustrate the public law litigation Chayes 
63. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim­
its of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'y REV. 95, 97-99 (1974). 
64. "One shotters" are persons, businesses, or organizations that deal infre­
quently with the legal system. [d. at 97. 
65. Joel B. Grossman et aI., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & 
SOC'y REV. 803, 803 (1999). 
66. See Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 4 (detailing the involvement 
of vitalist disability activists as Schiavo transformed from an individual case to a cause 
celebre). 
67. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977) 
(describing the path, through a series of court cases, toward the landmark U.S. Supreme 
Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), ruling segregation 
of the races in public schools unconstitutional). 
68. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976). Chayes spoke particularly of federal litigation but noted 
that litigation in state courts followed a similar trend. [d. at 1284 n.12. 
69. [d. at 1284. 
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analyzed.70 Using litigation to achieve what might be termed politi­
cal ends, as Chayes described, can be appropriate in health care 
settings, such as those in which patients with little consumer or po­
litical power seek to call attention to the illegality of certain wide­
spread, uniform practices on the part of insurers,71 or in which 
advocacy groups seek to enjoin enforcement of regulatory policies 
impacting health care access.72 
Such use of litigation for political purposes is not appropriate, 
however, in cases like Schiavo,73 In Schiavo, there was at issue no 
widespread activity-no law, regulation, policy, or practice-affect­
ing a large group of people.74 Vitalist disability activists (who do 
not constitute all disability activists)75 would argue that the decision 
Mr. Schiavo made, to ask a court to authorize the withdrawal of 
medically supplied nutrition and hydration from Ms. Schiavo, is in 
fact indicative of common and widespread disability discrimination. 
In the litigation itself, they argued that Mr. Schiavo, and others ad­
vocating cessation of treatment, devalued Ms. Schiavo's existence 
because of a disability from which she suffered,76 just as many other 
persons with disabilities are inappropriately and illegally devalued 
every day. In making that argument in court about Ms. Schiavo's 
treatment, however, the activists who participated as amici curiae77 
70. Id.; see also Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights 
Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 V AND. L. REv. 2305, 2308 (2004) (describing 
"public impact" litigation in the context of human rights). 
71. Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient Empower­
ment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8-11 (1998). 
72. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding action seeking to enjoin enforce­
ment of a Food & Drug Administration policy limiting access to certain experimental 
drugs), petition for reh'g denied, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 
F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996) (alleging a breakdown in the federal government's system 
of health maintenance organization oversight and review), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 
1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999). 
73. See generally Alan Meisel, The Role of Litigation in End of Life Care: A 
Reappraisal, HASTINGS OrR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S247. 
74. See Chayes, supra note 68, at 1308 (describing one advantage of the public 
law model as being that it permits "ad hoc applications of broad national policy in 
situations of limited scope"). 
75. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3. 
76. See, e.g., Schiavo ex reI. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), 
affg, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), reh'g en bane denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th 
Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005); Schiavo ex reI. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), affg 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005), reh'g en bane 
denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005). See generally 
Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, supra note 3, at 457. 
77. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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or who funded Ms. Schiavo's parents' efforts78 were misusing the 
litigation process. 
Rather than address the court in a case about the quintessen­
tially individual features of Ms. Schiavo's situation, such activists 
should have limited their involvement to legislative lobbying. End­
of-life decision-making cases, including Ms. Schiavo's, are quintes­
sentially individual, involving private matters such as life-and-death 
choices, which most people agree should not even be in court, much 
less litigated by interest groupS.79 It is only when some dissatisfied 
individual or group of individuals with a personal stake in a case 
seeks judicial review that such cases even go to court. They are 
private. They are personal. They are individual. They stand in 
sharp contrast to the sorts of cases involving allegations of wide­
spread wrongdoing, such as those in which students and parents 
challenge school segregation laws or patients seek review of uni­
form insurance practices applied in determining payment or denial 
of claims for health care coverage. There is no room in this per­
sonal sort of litigation for forces other than those who know and 
care for the patient. In Schiavo in particular, use of litigation for 
broader political ends resulted in misdirection: "[T]he person of 
Theresa Schiavo became lost in the media and political process, 
particularly during the last two years of her life, when third party 
interests attached themselves to her case."80 According to Ms. 
Schiavo's guardian ad litem, who attempted to mediate a resolution 
during late 2003, "Once third parties and the press became in­
volved, the mold was set and there was no desire or capacity among 
the parties to seek comprornise."81 
In sum, Schiavo did not present the sort of situation in which 
persons without political voice are trying to challenge a coherent 
policy or law.82 Contrary to the wishes of activists who attempted 
to portray it as such, it was not the sort of case through which struc­
78. See supra note 5. 
79. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, at 3-7 (stating that generally deci­
sions about foregoing treatment should be made in the clinical setting rather than 
through the courts). 
80. Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra note 25, at 547. 
81. Jay Wolfson, Erring on the Side of Theresa Schiavo: Reflections of the Special 
Guardian ad Litem, HASTINGS CTR. REp., May-June 2005, at 19. 
82. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), petition for reh'g denied, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. 
CiT. 2006); KLUGER, supra note 67 (describing challenges to uniform statutory imple­
mentations of "separate but equal" policies in schoolhouses across the land). Regard­
ing the limits of litigation in the development of end-of-life decision-making law, see 
Meisel, supra note 73. 
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tural reform can be achieved to remedy broad-based legislative, ad­
ministrative, or policy failures. 83 Rather, the case was a traditional 
bipolar case, with private interests at issue, arising in an area of law 
that calls for determinations based on the wishes of each individual 
patient. The shame of Ms. Schiavo's case being hijacked in the judi­
cial system by special interests, and the shame of the thought that 
other family members, surrogate decision-makers, or health care 
providers might feel "Schiavo'ed," is that the involvement of 
outside political interests is uncommon, unnecessary, and improper 
in this type of case. 
B. 	 Lessons About the Tone and Pattern of End-of-Life Decision­
Making 
More broadly, the tenor of the Schiavo debate may have al­
tered the tone and pattern of end-of-life decision-making law in 
general. Addressing the broad questions at hand through litigation 
is inappropriate, as just noted, but it is perfectly appropriate to ad­
dress those broad questions in the legislative arena. In that arena, 
some changes would still develop, although the lack of legislative 
success in significantly revising state end-of-life decision-making 
statutes thus far reinforces the impression that politicians erred in 
introducing bills to do SO.84 Surveys and public-opinion polls cer­
tainly indicate as much.85 The law thus far has emerged intact, a 
victory for those who celebrate the ability to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, including medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 
The very fact that more than a dozen state legislatures considered 
such bills, however, demonstrates the strength of the political forces 
behind them. Those forces undoubtedly will continue to influence 
this area of the law, in at least the following ways. 
The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), founded to 
oppose Roe v. Wade,86 will continue, and may even strengthen, its 
efforts to revise end-of-life decision-making law in accordance with 
its mission of "restor[ing] legal protection to innocent human 
83. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1979) (identifying such cases as the type in which judicial involvement on such a 
broad scale is appropriate). 
84. See Ellen Goodman, Deserting A Culture War, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 
2006, at 17A (asking, "What if they gave a culture war and nobody came?" with respect 
to the failure of such legislation). 
85. 	 See generally Blendon et aI., supra note 32; PEW REPORT, supra note 49. 
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy). 
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life. "87 The NRLC is the organization that drafted the model legis­
lation that many legislators in Florida and other states unsuccess­
fully introduced during and after Schiavo. The model legislation is 
still available on the NRLC's website, and it is still playing with 
emotions through its inflammatory title, the "Model State Starva­
tion and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention 
Act."88 It has been amended since its initial promulgation,89 but it 
remains available and ready for submission to legislators for rein­
troduction in state legislatures. The NRLC's Terri's Legacy Plan, 
currently dedicated to "build[ing] a network ... to help protect the 
lives of people like" Ms. Schiavo, may lead to advocacy in favor of 
the model legislation once initial network-building has gotten un­
derway.9o Certainly the network, created through the Terri Schin­
dler Schiavo Foundation, has advocacy as one of its goals.91 
The NRLC also has promulgated and displays prominently on 
its website a "pro-life living will" titled The Will to Live.92 Strong 
proponents of patient autonomy would have difficulty arguing that 
it is inappropriate for a patient to make clear in a living will that he 
or she wishes to receive certain treatments, but this document 
seems to do more than offer that option. Lois Shepherd describes 
this document and the NRLC website's descriptions of and justifi­
87. H.B. 701, 2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); Nat'l Right to Life Comm., Mission 
Statement, http://www.nrlc.orglMissionstatement.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
88. NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30; see also Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo 
Case, supra note 31. 
89. Compare NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30 (bearing notation "revised Janu­
ary 2006"), with H.B. 701,2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (version introduced in Flor­
ida during the Schiavo debates). 
90. See Terri's Legacy Project, http://www.nrlc.orgIProjects!Legacy!index.html 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (identifying Terri's Legacy Plan as helping to build the net­
work created by "the Terri Schindler Schiavo Foundation (establiShed by Terri's par­
ents, brother and sister)"). 
91. Terri Schindler Schiavo Found., About the Foundation, http://www.terrisfight. 
orgimainlinks.php?table=main_abouUhe_foundation_2&id=143 (last visited Jan. 16, 
2007). 
92. See ROBERT POWELL CTR. FOR MED. ETHICS, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE, STATE 
OF FLORIDA, HEALTHCARE SURROGATE, WILL TO LIVE FORM 7 (2005) [hereinafter 
WILL TO LIVE FORM], available at http://www.nrlc.orgieuthanasia/willtolive/docs/ 
florida.revll05.pdf. Through the "Will to Live Project," individuals can get online ac­
cess to "Will to Live" forms appropriate for the state that they live in. Nat'l Right to 
Life Comm., "Will to Live" Project, http://www.nrlc.orgieuthanasia!willtolive/StatesList. 
html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007); see also Nat'l Right to Life Comm., The Will to Live 
Project, http://www.nrlc.orgleuthanasia/willtolive/index.html(last visited Jan. 16, 2007) 
(for a discussion of the various reasons to fill out one of the offered forms); Terri Schin­
dler Schiavo Found., Will to Live, http://www.terrisfight.orglquicklinks.php?id=41 (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2007) (replication of the "Will to Live" form). 
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cations for it, as having two aims: (1) to make people feel less se­
cure about whether their end-of-life choices will be honored once 
they are incapacitated, and (2) to make people choose rather than 
refuse treatment.93 Indeed, the document has a section titled "Gen­
eral Presumption for Life" and specifies that "[f]ood and water are 
not medical treatment, but basic necessities," so that nutrition and 
fluids are to be administered by any means possible "to the full 
extent necessary both to preserve [the signer's] life and to assure 
[the signer] the optimal health possible."94 There is no need here to 
address the legal inaccuracy of the statement discussing "food and 
water" as if they were the same as medically supplied nutrition and 
hydration.95 Nor is this an appropriate point at which to discuss the 
inadvisability of administering nutrition and hydration "to the full 
extent possible."96 Rather, the importance of such statements in 
this setting is to demonstrate how the NRLC seeks to continue to 
influence people's attitudes and thought processes with respect to 
end-of-life decision-making. 
The NRLC Model Act also includes a provision that could 
foreshadow an increase in investigative and regulatory oversight of 
end-of-life decision-making. It specifically authorizes a "state pro­
tection and advocacy agency" or a "public official with appropriate 
jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce the laws" to file a lawsuit to 
protest any proposed withholding or withdrawal of medically sup­
plied nutrition and hydration.97 Such authorization reaches beyond 
the already-existing powers of such an official to take action to pre­
vent abuse or violations of the law. To understand this, it is essen­
tial to remember that the law currently contemplates private 
medical decision-making, out of the spotlight, without the intrusion 
of others except when one of those involved-someone acquainted 
with the patient-protests a treatment decision. Court review does 
not occur in the vast majority of cases, if all involved agree that a 
93. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19. 
94. WILL TO LIVE FORM, supra note 92, at 7. 
95. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3, at 352-53. 
96. For a graphic depiction of a situation in which it is possible to administer 
medically supplied nutrition and hydration, yet one in which almost no one would think 
it was a good idea, see Alicia J. Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimi­
nation Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining 
Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 13-18 (2004). The article describes the case of Sheila Pouliout. 
97. NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30, § 5; see Shepherd, State Legislative Pro­
posals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 15, 17 (describing proposals in Ohio to 
essentially give priority to potential surrogate decision-makers who agree to provide 
medically supplied nutrition and hydration). 
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treatment decision is what the patient would have wanted.98 In 
contrast, this provision of the NRLC Model Act would authorize an 
action for injunctive relief not only by persons who know the pa­
tient but also by state officials 
to secure a court determination, notwithstanding the position of a 
guardian or surrogate, [as to] whether there is clear and convinc­
ing evidence that the person legally incapable of making health 
care decisions, when legally capable of making such decisions, 
gave express and informed consent to withdrawing or withhold­
ing hydration or nutrition in the applicable circumstances.99 
In other words, the Model Act would authorize governmental 
officials to file a lawsuit against surrogate decision-makers and 
health care providers to question withholding or withdrawal of 
medically supplied nutrition and hydration even when all those ac­
tually involved agree that withholding or withdrawal is appropriate. 
The opinions of those who know best would not count in the sense 
of shielding them from being dragged into court. Instead, members 
of the NRLC and others sharing similar views alert state officials 
about instances of the withholding or withdrawal of medically sup­
plied nutrition and hydration because of a general policy-based be­
lief that withholding or withdrawing it is always improper. lOo They 
want the power of the government to extend beyond attempts to 
intervene in cases in which individual wishes are determined,lOI and 
instead affirmatively question the decisions of those who know the 
patient best. State officials who are politically beholden to groups 
such as the NRLC may begin to look for ways to do just that, re­
gardless of whether the NRLC Model Act is passed within their 
respective jurisdictions. 
98. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 3.18[E] ("On balance, the courts 
have been unreceptive to the idea of routine judicial review."); id. § 3.19 (describing 
presumption against judicial review). But see id. § 3.22 (describing limited categories of 
cases in which judicial review is required in some jurisdictions). 
99. NRLC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § SA (emphasis added). 
100. As noted previously, in Schiavo, Florida's Department of Children and Fam­
ilies (DCF) received more than 100 reports about Ms. Schiavo. Many were duplicative. 
In re Records of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., Nos. 05-1879-CI-003 & 05-2347­
CI-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 14,2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/ 
pdCfiles/DCF _Abuse_Investigations_parC1.pdf; see Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, 
supra note 1, at April 15, 2005 entry. Duplication would occur if, for example, many 
people were calling DCF with separate reports based on the same e-mail or blog entry. 
101. Cf In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(rejecting an attempt by Florida's Department of Children and Families to intervene in 
the Schiavo case). 
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Persons working in this area of the law also must prepare for 
continued debate over standards of proof. Most states require that 
clear and convincing evidence support a request for withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a patient who has no de­
cision-making capacity.102 Florida law incorporates such a standard 
of proof, and the courts found it satisfied, although, as commenta­
tors have noted, the evidence supporting the conclusion that Ms. 
Schiavo would not have wanted treatment was not overwhelm­
ing.103 Since Schiavo, calls have gone out for increased emphasis on 
ensuring that evidence is truly clear and convincing before a court 
may authorize withdrawal of treatment.104 At least one commenta­
tor has even argued for a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of 
proof,105 reflecting the frustration felt by those who disagreed with 
the courts' decisions in Schiavo. Battles over the standard of proof 
will continue, which is unfortunate since the reality is that no one 
talks about these issues with any level of specificity. To require too 
much proof would be to sentence people to endure invasive treat­
ment they do not want. Some people will lose their right to prevent 
others from poking, prodding, and invading their bodies at a time 
when they did not want such intervention, all because they did not 
use specific enough language in discussing the matter in advance, 
when they could not have known specifics.l06 
Finally, Schiavo will reverberate in discussions about resource 
allocation. Money and other resources such as labor, drugs, and 
time are limited, and end-of-life treatment consumes its fair share 
of each. In the opinion of Jay Wolfson, the guardian ad litem ap­
pointed for Ms. Schiavo under Terri's Law, Schiavo will force peo­
102. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 3-10. This requirement prop­
erly represents a judgment about how much evidence a court will require, not a deter­
mination of the applicable substantive decision-making standard. See Meisel, supra 
note 73, at S50 (noting the conflation of the burden of proof and the substantive deci­
sion-making standard as a source of confusion). 
103. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 
13-14; see also Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth, supra note 4, at 584. 
104. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 
29; Elizabeth Price Foley, Legislature Can Get It Right This Time, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 
4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 23025509 (Westlaw) (proposing that the legislature 
amend Florida law to specify factors to be considered in determining whether clear and 
convincing evidence exists). 
105. Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law 
Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 151, 164-65 (2006). 
106. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 32 (quoting a neurologist as saying "[ilt's ex­
tremely difficult for people to anticipate every treatment about which decisions need to 
be made in the future," and "it's simply unreasonable to expect young adults" to exe­
cute advance directives). 
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pIe to think differently about end-of-life resource allocation as a 
matter of state and federal policy, institutional practice with respect 
to technical treatments, and risk management.107 Wolfson urges 
that such consideration become explicit, saying, "If five years from 
now, we should face another Schiavo case, it would be a tragedy of 
public policy."108 It is unlikely, however, that policymakers, the 
public, or even health care providers will address these issues ex­
plicitly, despite the shadow of Schiavo. Once again, as with individ­
uals who resist specifying their wishes clearly, it is difficult to 
anticipate and talk about painful subjects. 
C. Lessons About Bioethics 
It also is possible to go beyond end-of-life decision-making law 
and see Schiavo as a symbol of generally increasing politicization in 
bioethics. George Annas says that politicization has occurred gen­
erally in bioethics over recent years,109 and Schiavo seems like an 
illustration in stark relief. 
One may identify politicization in bioethics through at least 
two different techniques. The first is to examine the methods 
through which persons speaking as bioethicists engage in analysis. 
Annas notes that recent events involve individuals calling them­
selves bioethicists who opine based upon their religious back­
grounds and senses of morality rather than engaging in analysis 
based upon principles, case-based reasoning, or other traditional 
modes of philosophical discourse. llo For Annas, Schiavo illustrates 
this phenomenon through the involvement in its latter stages of a 
neurologist named William Cheshire.111 Eight days prior to Ms. 
Schiavo's death, Dr. Cheshire signed an affidavit in support of 
treatment discussing morality and ethics along with neurological 
opinions.H2 Based on this and other recent events in bioethics, An­
nas asks whether "bioethics [must] accept rigid fundamentalist be­
107. Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra note 25, at 551. 
108. Id. 
109. Annas, supra note 6, at 74-75 (referring to the appointment of Leon Kass, a 
neoconservative in favor of banning stem cell research, as chair of the President's Coun­
cil on Bioethics). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 73-74. 
112. See Aff. of William Polk Cheshire, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http:// 
www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/032305_Cheshire_affidavit.pdf; see also 
Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at "Dr. Cheshire's Affidavit" in March 
23, 2005 entry. 
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lievers as bioethicists just because they call themselves 
bioethicists. "113 
Alternatively, one may identify politicization in bioethics by 
examining the way that bioethics has influenced the outcome of 
overarching public policy debates. Autonomy and self-determina­
tion have been the buzz words of power within bioethics over the 
past forty or so years. Recently, however, those buzz words have 
come under fire. Carol Levine sees a "sustained critique of individ­
ual autonomy as a guiding principle" in a recent report issued by 
the President's Council on Bioethics.114 Similarly, pointing in part 
to debates over stem-cell and fetal tissue research, former member 
of the National Bioethics Advisory Committee R. Alta Charo says 
that "conservatives seem to feel that liberal bioethics has been an 
obstacle to regulating medicine and scientific research" through its 
emphasis on the principles of autonomy and self-determination.115 
Bioethicists and the courts in Schiavo emphasized Ms. Schiavo's au­
tonomy and self-determination as a basis for withdrawing her treat­
ment; those opposing withdrawal of treatment argued that her 
autonomy was not at issue because the only way she appropriately 
could have exercised her autonomy was through an advance direc­
tive, and she had no advance directive. Echoing Charo, it seems 
that Schiavo protesters believed that by permitting an incapacitated 
person's wishes to be determined through evidence other than a 
written advance directive, "liberal bioethics has been an obstacle 
to" regulation of medical decision-making. At both the beginning 
and end of life, "bioethicists" with the qualifications Annas notes 
are more frequently advancing political positions contrary to the 
positions of those advocating autonomy and self-determination. 
113. Annas, supra note 6, at 74. 
114. Carol Levine, The President's Council on Autonomy: Never Mind!, HAS­
TINGS CrR. REP., May-June 2006, at 46, 46-47. The report, titled Taking Care: Ethical 
Caregiving in Our Aging Society, and available at http://www.bioethics.gov!reports! 
takin~care!takin~care.pdf, criticizes instruction advance directives and questions in­
volvement of family when a patient is unable to make his or her own health care deci­
sions. Some of the criticism of advance directives is well-placed. See generally Angela 
Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30. But Levine notes, "If many Americans have signed ad­
vance directives and appointed proxies in the aftermath of the Schiavo case, it was at 
least partly to avoid family conflicts and to preserve family unity, not as an expression 
of unbridled individual autonomy." Levine, supra, at 47. She sees the report as dimin­
ishing those attempts. 
115. R. Alta Charo, Passing on the Right: Conservative Bioethics is Closer Than It 
Appears, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 307, 310 (2004) [hereinafter Charo, Passing on the 
Right]. 
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This statement does not imply that consideration of religious 
viewpoints necessarily leads to inappropriate politicization. Relig­
ious viewpoints have always played a part in bioethics, including 
authorizing refusals of life-sustaining treatment.116 The Roman 
Catholic theological doctrine of double effect, for example, has be­
come well-recognized in both bioethics and law.117 Yet there are 
differences between religious and secular bioethics; most notably, 
"[u]nlike secular bioethics, individual autonomy is not the ultimate 
value in Catholic bioethics."118 Such differences should be recog­
nized. Persons espousing Catholic theology or a Jewish mode of 
moral analysis (to name but two different categories of religiously 
based thought) generally have acknowledged the differences be­
tween the two types of bioethics.119 Notably, William Cheshire did 
not identify himself as a moral theologian or even as being of a 
particular moral background. He filed his affidavit as a bioethicist 
and a neurologistPO It was only upon noticing certain facts in his 
background and investigating him that the importance of his relig­
ious beliefs in his decision-making process became clear. 
Schiavo, in fact, turns out to be a prime example of a situation 
in which "it is the politics we are debating more often than the 
bioethics, and it may well be that sweeping political forces will de­
termine the policy outcomes more than the merits of the individual 
arguments."121 It is easy in this debate to forget that ethical analy­
116. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy, Terri Schiavo and the Roman Catholic Tradition 
of Forgoing Extraordinary Means of Care, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359 (2005). See gen­
erally Peter Clark, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics by David F. Kelly, 21 1.L. 
& RELIGION 201, 201 (2005) (book review) ("The influence of religion on health care 
ethics is often lost to many secular bioethicists today."). 
117. See Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito: The Principle ofDouble Effect in Ameri­
can Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469,471-73 (2005). 
118. Leonard 1. Nelson, III, Catholic Bioethics and the Case of Terri Schiavo, 35 
CUMBo L. REV. 543,544 (2005). "Double effect, traced historically to Thomas Aquinas, 
proposes that under certain circumstances, it is permissible unintentionally to cause un­
foreseen 'evil' effects that would not be permissible to cause intentionally." Lyons, 
supra note 117, at 471; see also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 5.02[D] 
(describing the "philosophical principle of double effect, originating in Roman Catholic 
moral theology, which states that there are situations in which it is morally justifiable to 
cause evil in the pursuit of good"). 
119. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Does Bioethics Provide Answers?: Secular and 
Religious Bioethics and Our Procreative Future, 35 CUMBo L. REV. 473 (2005); see also 
Shelly Cohen, Note, De-Moralizing Death: A Humanistic Approach to the Sanctity of 
Life, 14 ELDER L.J. 91 (2006). 
120. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at "Dr. Cheshire's Affi­
davit" in March 23, 2005 entry. 
121. Charo, Realbioethik, supra note 33, at 14. 
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sis and public policy are two different things.122 In Schiavo, as with 
so many other current issues, conversations revolved around ques­
tions of human dignity rather than political philosophy.123 
Unfortunately, however, the differences between those two ar­
eas of concern are huge; debate over the role each of them does or 
should play in American society in the twenty-first century will be 
an ongoing theme of bioethics over the next few years. 
D. 	 Lessons About American Constitutional Republican 
Government 
A broader political issue is the appropriate role of various 
branches of government. While students of constitutional law are 
(or at least should be) well-aware of the limits put on the various 
branches of government in the American constitutional system, it 
became painfully obvious during the legislative debates on Schiavo 
that much of the general public was not. The courts especially were 
attacked, through political statements, such as "[t]he actions on the 
part of the Florida court are unconscionable,"124 and denunciations 
of judges as activists for approving withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's 
medically supplied nutrition and hydration.125 It was obvious that 
some members of the public, and perhaps some legislators, failed to 
understand that trial courts engage in fact-finding and that appel­
late courts are not and should not be empowered to revisit that fact­
finding.n6 Similarly, it was obvious that citizens did not understand 
122. Charo, Passing on the Right, supra note 115, at 311 (noting "the enduring 
question of the relationship between ethical analysis and public policy. Moral angst is 
one thing; federal criminalization of research or medical practice is another"). 
123. In describing the focus of the President's Commission on Bioethics, Charo 
cautions against underestimating the "significant difference between arguing that some­
thing is unethical and arguing that it is (or ought to be) prohibited by federal law." Id. 
124. Santorum Fights to Save Life of Terri Schiavo (Mar. 17, 2005), reprinted in 
THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO: ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE 130 (Arthur L. Caplan et 
aI., eds., Prometheus Books 2006) (statement of U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.»; see 
also Kurt Darr, Terri Schindler Schiavo: End-Game, 83 NEXUS 29, 30 (2005) (stating 
that "many observers forgot their basic high school civics when they asserted that the 
three branches of government ... are co-equal"). 
125. James J. Peters, Labels Create Chaos in Courts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 
23,2005, at A15, available at 2005 WLNR 23739433 (Westlaw). 
126. In response to a request from Ms. Schiavo's parents that the Florida District 
Court of Appeal review the trial court's ruling de novo, the court reminded them, "It is 
simply not proper for this court to review such a fact-intensive determination." In re 
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Bowing to their concerns, how­
ever, the court went a step further and assured them that it had dug into the evidence 
and that "[iJf we were called upon to review the guardianship court's decision de novo, 
we would still affirm it." [d. 
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the way the judiciary serves as a "check" on the legislative and ex­
ecutive branches in our system of government.127 Regardless of 
one's agreement or disagreement with the outcome of a particular 
court case, there is value to upholding the court system and the way 
it works.128 Such a lesson is often a foundational point in basic civ­
ics education. Yet it was lost in this case. 
Perhaps it was lost because basic civics education seems to 
have fallen by the wayside. In a survey administered to Florida 
adults in December 2005, only 59 percent of those surveyed were 
able to identify the three branches of government as being the judi­
cial, executive, and legislative branches.129 The American Bar As­
sociation conducted a nationwide poll showing the same results in 
July 2005.13° In Florida, 16 percent of those surveyed identified the 
government's branches as "Republican, Democrat and Indepen­
dent," in a stunning demonstration of just how much power politi­
cal parties have. 131 
Such findings prompted the Florida Bar to lobby for and to 
engage in more civics education, and its lobbying efforts resulted in 
the passage of a law requiring students in public middle schools to 
successfully complete "[t]hree middle school or higher courses in 
social studies, one semester of which must include the study of state 
127. For example, ignoring the fact that Ms. Schiavo's medically supplied nutri­
tion and hydration had been withdrawn in accordance with a duly entered, final court 
order, activists pressured Governor Bush to "protect" Ms. Schiavo from "abuse" by 
removing her from her hospice and reinserting the tube through which she could re­
ceive that nutrition and hydration. See David Sommer & Blaine Silversmith, Legal 
Defeats Mount for Schiavo Parents, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 25, 2005, available at http:// 
www.tampatrib.comIMGBH2MOZP6E.html(quoting activist as saying, "Gov. Bush and 
the Department of Children and Families do not have to ask permission of a judge to 
enforce the statutes that are on the books .... It's an appalling lack of will"); see also 
Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 12. But see Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, 
supra note 3, at 471-72 (arguing that the courts at the federal level failed to respect 
Congress). 
128. Kathy L. Cerminara, With Schiavo, Congress Thumbs Nose at Courts, OR. 
LANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2005, at A15, available at 2005 WLNR 23739416 (Westlaw). 
129. Bar Pushes for More Civics Education, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 1 
[hereinafter Bar Pushes for More Civics Education]; see also Press Release, The Florida 
Bar, Poll Shows Need for More Civics Education for Florida Adults (Jan. 11, 2006) 
(with other supporting information about the poll and the Bar's efforts) (on file with 
Western New England Law Review), available at http://www.floridabar.orglTFBrrFB 
Public.nsflWNewsReleases/07303EEA70164467852570F20079DACE?OpenDocument. 
130. See AM. BAR Assoc., CiVICS EDUCATION (2005), available at http://www. 
abanews.orgldocs/divisionofpowers_705.pdf. 
131. Bar Pushes for More Civics Education, supra note 129. 
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and federal government and civics education."132 One hopes that 
such a step will help remedy this breathtaking lack of knowledge, 
reminiscent of the misunderstanding of governmental structure dis­
played during Schiavo. Such misunderstanding clearly is more 
widespread than one might hope or expect, and it has its roots in a 
lack of sufficient knowledge of governmental basics. 
In the Schiavo controversy, many spoke about how the elected 
representatives of the people were coming to the rescue of a wo­
man lying in bed, while activist judges did not care about her. Such 
arguments ignore the fact that, in Florida, judges, including the trial 
court judge who decided Schiavo, are eIected.133 They also ignore 
the fact that legislators, the peoples' elected representatives, later 
realized that they had not been acting in accordance with the ma­
jority's wishes, but only in accordance with the wishes of the most 
vocal, when they acted.134 Rather, as Annas has quoted Jeffrey 
Rosen: 
[T]he conservative interest groups have it exactly backward. 
Their standard charge is that unelected judges are thwarting the 
will of the people by overturning laws passed by elected repre­
sentatives. But in our new topsy-turvy world, it's the elected rep­
resentatives who are thwarting the will of the people, which is 
being channeled instead by unelected judges.135 
In Schiavo's aftermath ultimately lies an opportunity to improve 
citizens' involvement in and awareness of end-of-life decision-mak­
ing. Whether that happens, however, may depend at least in part 
on how well basic civics educational efforts work. 
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.4156(1)(a)(3) (West 2006); see Gary Blankenship, 
More Emphasis To Be Placed On Civics Education, FLA. BAR NEWS, June 1, 2006, at l. 
Others have noted a similar need for education about end-of-life treatment and deci­
sion-making. Mayo, supra note 18, at 590; James L. Bernat, What Relevance to Neurol­
ogists Is the Tragic Case of Terri Schiavo?, 5 NEUROLOGY TODAY 4, 5 (May 2005) 
(advocating "professional and public education about the medical facts of patients with 
states of impaired consciousness"). 
133. Judge Greer, in fact, faced a re-election challenge. He won by a healthy 
margin. Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Aug. 31, 2004 entry. 
134. See Annas, supra note 6, at 78 n.109 (citing polls conducted immediately 
before and after Ms. Schiavo's death indicating that "seventy-six percent of Americans 
disapproved of congressional involvement in the Schiavo case ... eighty-two percent of 
Americans sa[id] Congress and the President should stay out of deciding what happens 
to Terri Schiavo," and "seventy-five percent of Americans say it was 'not right' for 
Congress to intervene in the Schiavo case"). 
135. Id. at 78 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES WKLY. 6-17 
(June 12, 2005)). 
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CONCLUSION 
More than a year after Theresa Schiavo's death, little has 
changed. The judicial rulings in her case and the ultimate impact of 
the statutes passed to address her situation have, for the most part, 
left intact previously existing end-of-life decision-making law. Yet 
it is possible to recognize both existing and potential effects of the 
political culture wars surrounding Ms. Schiavo's death. 
Regardless of their positions with respect to Ms. Schiavo's case 
in particular, most observers would believe that its effect was posi­
tive in the sense that it heightened citizens' awareness of certain 
areas of the law. More people than before began discussing end-of­
life treatment choices with their families and friends as a result of 
Schiavo. More people than before obtained and executed forms for 
written advance directives in attempts to ensure that their families 
and friends did not have to debate what they would want done if 
they ended up lying in a PVS, dependent on medically supplied nu­
trition and hydration. Schiavo also increased recognition of the 
limited amount most Americans know and understand about the 
way their government works. Schiavo did some good to the extent 
that it may result in better end-of-life decision-making processes 
and in more educational efforts to assist citizens in playing their 
roles in society. 
Collateral damage also exists, however. The political culture 
wars surrounding the final months of Ms. Schiavo's life confirmed 
the existence of deep schisms between certain factions of society. 
Those who joined in the protests against withdrawal of Ms. Schi­
avo's medically supplied nutrition and hydration raised questions 
about extremely well-settled areas of law and bioethics. They did 
so in an emotionally charged atmosphere, using rhetoric and im­
agery that is not likely to quickly fade. They continue to advocate 
legislative changes that were proposed and failed to pass during the 
final period of Ms. Schiavo's life. 
In this manner, the Schiavo experience could cast a pall over 
future end-of-life decision-making in at least three ways. First, the 
media spectacle it turned into is likely to lurk as a threat in the 
minds of surrogate decision-makers and health-care providers, 
whose primary goal instead should be to worry about doing what 
the patient would have wanted. Second, and more broadly, activists 
will continue to attempt to change the law in a manner that would 
diminish the focus on individual patients and substitute broad­
based restrictions on individual patient choice. Finally, Schiavo 
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symbolizes the sort of politicization of bioethics that many in the 
business of providing health care likely wish they could avoid. 
Medical care and end-of-life decision-making are supposed to be 
about what individual patients need and the way they want their 
lives to end, not about the symbolism that politically motivated 
groups can attach to each case. 
